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August 26, 2014 
 
 
Chief Justice Tani Gorre Cantil-Sakauye 
The Supreme Court of California 
350 McAllister St. 
San Francisco, CA 94102-4797 
 
Re: Support for Petition for Review, PDX, Inc. v. Hardin, 1st Civ. No. A137035 
 
Dear Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye: 
 
I am writing pursuant to Rule 28(g) to urge you to accept the Petition for Review 
filed in this case. I have studied First Amendment law and cyberspace law for 20 
years as a law professor here at UCLA, and I have taught and written about tort 
law as well. I have no financial interest in this dispute or the litigants, and I speak 
only for myself. 
* * * 
This case raises an important issue that merits the Court’s attention: When may 
information providers be liable for disseminating accurate information that third 
parties use in misleading ways? Precedent, especially Winter v. G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 
938 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1991) (applying the Ninth Circuit’s understanding of 
California law), and Rivera v. First DataBank, Inc., 187 Cal. App. 4th 709 (2010), 
suggests that such liability is generally unavailable. The Court of Appeal’s decision 
in this case, though, opens the door for a broad range of such liability. It would be 
helpful to the public, to distributors, to the bench, and to the bar for the Court to 
step in to resolve this issue. 
PDX is a distributor of factual information. As the court below noted, the 
relevant “component of its business involves disseminating patient drug education 
monographs authored by third parties,” 227 Cal. App. 4th at 162-63, and in the 
process editing out certain sections, id. at 163. Disseminating and editing 
monographs is the business of a book and monograph distributor and publisher. 
(Note that, a speaker may be a publisher for First Amendment purposes but may 
nonetheless be immune from liability as a publisher under 47 U.S.C. § 230. See, e.g., 
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Zhang v. Baidu.com Inc., 2014 WL 1282730, *6 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (search engine 
editorial decisions are protected by First Amendment); Jurin v. Google Inc., 695 F. 
Supp. 2d 1117, 1122-23 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (search engines are immune under 47 
U.S.C. § 230).) 
To be sure, PDX is not a distributor of controversial political opinion. And, in 
keeping with the times, it distributes its publications electronically, leaving it to 
others to print them. But in both of these respects, PDX is very similar to many 
modern information distributors, which are protected by the First Amendment. 
Generally speaking, distributors and publishers are not liable under products 
liability law or negligence law, even when they distribute false information, 
including false information that can kill. That was the holding in Winter, where 
G.P. Putnam’s Sons disseminated The Encyclopedia of Mushrooms. The book 
allegedly “contained erroneous and misleading information concerning the identifi-
cation of the most deadly species of mushrooms,” which led the plaintiff readers of 
the book to become “critically ill.” (Fortunately, liver transplants saved the readers’ 
lives.) 938 F.2d at 1034. 
There are, it is said, old mushroom hunters and bold mushroom hunters, but no 
old, bold mushroom hunters. Careful mushroom hunters necessarily rely on books 
such as the Encyclopedia to protect their lives.  
Yet despite that, the Ninth Circuit concluded that, partly because of the First 
Amendment and partly because of California tort law, a distributor or publisher 
could not be held liable in products liability law or negligence even for allegedly 
false and dangerous statements contained in its book. “[T]he defendant[ has] no 
duty to investigate the accuracy of the contents of the books it publishes.” Id. at 
1037. “Were we tempted to create this duty, the gentle tug of the First Amendment 
and the values embodied therein would remind us of the social costs.” Id. 
Likewise, Rivera concluded that an “independent publisher of ‘medication 
databases’” of medication monographs, much like those involved in this case, was 
engaged in constitutionally protected speech. 187 Cal. App. 4th at 709, 715-17. And 
the Court of Appeal held that a claim that the databases were negligently “‘buried . 
. . in the fine print,’” could not be sustained, partly because “Plaintiffs failed to 
demonstrate defendant owed them any duty.” Id. at 718-19. 
The Court of Appeal in this case tried to distinguish the precedents on three 
main grounds: 
1. The court concluded that, “[u]nlike [in] Rivera, here there was evidence that 
the black-box warning had been deleted from the monograph Hardin received with 
her prescription.” 227 Cal. App. 4th at 167. But distributors and publishers often 
choose whether to abridge an existing work and, if so, how to abridge it. Indeed, 
that is one valuable service that such speakers often provide, and it has long been 
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seen as a constitutionally protected service. See Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 
418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (holding that “[t]he choice of material to go into a 
newspaper, and the decisions made as to limitations on the size and content of the 
paper” are constitutionally protected); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n 
of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 9-18 (1986) (plurality op.) (applying Tornillo to non-newspaper 
businesses). 
And here the removal of the warning did not make the disseminated monograph 
inaccurate. At most, the editing decision made the monograph incomplete—but all 
works are incomplete in certain respects, and allowing liability for such 
incompleteness would gravely burden those who edit, publish, and distribute 
information. Moreover, this is especially so when the distributor reasonably expects 
that the information that it distributes will not be the only source of information 
that the user consults. As PDX’s Petition for Review notes, PDX undertook to 
provide a “monograph to supplement the pharmacist’s advice and the Medication 
Guide.” Petn. for Rev. 35. The monograph distributed by PDX expressly stated that 
it was “[i]mportant to read the Medication Guide before use,” C.T. 131, 147. And 
PDX knew that the entity that printed the material for readers (Safeway) was 
legally obligated to provide further warnings. Petn. for Rev. at 38-41. 
Exposing a distributor to liability for disseminating material that, in a jury’s 
view, might be incomplete standing on its own would create a broad new form of 
liability for distributors and publishers. This is especially so in a situation where 
the material is accurate, and an intermediate distributor reasonably expects it to be 
made complete by further information that the ultimate distributor would provide. 
It would be helpful for this Court to be the one deciding whether such liability ought 
to be allowed. 
2. The court below concluded that Rivera did not apply because “it does not 
address Hardin’s theory that, in undertaking to provide patient drug monographs, 
PDX assumed a duty of care under the negligent undertaking doctrine.” 227 Cal. 
App. 4th at 168. “This record sufficiently makes out a claim that PDX assumed a 
duty of care by undertaking to render services to Safeway ‘of a kind [it] should have 
recognized as necessary for the protection of third persons....’” Id. at 169.  
But in this respect, PDX is likewise like many distributors, including the 
defendant in Winter. Book distributors know that readers may rely on their books; 
certainly the distributor in Winter must have realized this.  
Yet this alone does not generally suffice to make distributors and publishers 
liable, even when the distributed material allegedly contains affirmative 
misstatements on which readers do rely. This result is even more clearly correct 
when the allegation is simply that the material was incomplete, especially in a 
situation where the distributor reasonably expected some other entity (here, 
Safeway) to provide more complete information. 
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3. The court below took the view that plaintiffs were not really trying to hold 
PDX liable for distributing information; rather, the court relied on the view that 
plaintiffs were arguing “that PDX’s software program, not the information it 
produces, is the defective product.” 227 Cal. App. 4th at 169 (emphasis in original). 
But the allegedly defective feature of the software program—that it deleted three 
sections of the eight-section monograph, id.—was simply the way that PDX 
implemented its editorial decision to abridge the monographs in a particular way. 
Even if such an editorial decision should sometimes lead to liability, that liability 
would necessarily be premised on the supposedly “defective” “information” that the 
distributor or publisher “produces.” 
Two sorts of examples help illustrate this, and help show how important such 
questions are now becoming: 
A. News stories on particular topics are increasingly being written by computer 
algorithms. For instance, two months ago “[t]he Associated Press announced . . . 
that the majority of U.S. corporate earnings stories for [its] business news report 
will eventually be produced using automation technology.”1 Likewise, a March 2014 
Los Angeles Times article about an earthquake aftershock notes that “this post was 
created by an algorithm written by the author.”2 The algorithm, Quakebot, takes 
details reported by the U.S. Geological Survey and formats them into English 
prose.3 Such algorithms naturally select what and how to report it—for instance, to 
determine which “seismic events [have] a ‘newsworthy magnitude,’”4 and often to 
determine which raw data to include and which to omit. 
Say that a similar report at one point causes injury through its alleged 
incompleteness. This might happen, for instance, if seismology becomes able to 
predict the likelihood of aftershocks, but a future version of the article-writing 
software chooses not to include this information in the report; or if reports about 
                                            
1 Associated Press, A Leap Forward in Quarterly Earnings Stories, June 30, 
2014, http://blog.ap.org/2014/06/30/a-leap-forward-in-quarterly-earnings-stories/ 
(“The Associated Press announced in an advisory to customers today that the 
majority of U.S. corporate earnings stories for our business news report will 
eventually be produced using automation technology.”). 
2 Ken Schwencke, Earthquake Aftershock: 2.7 Quake Strikes near Westwood, L.A. 
Times, Mar. 17, 2014, http://articles.latimes.com/2014/ mar/17/news/earthquake-27-
quake-strikes-near-westwood-california-rdivor. 
3 Andrew Beaujon, L.A. Times Reporter Talks About His Story-Writing 
‘Quakebot’, Poynter, Mar. 17, 2014, http://www.poynter.org/latest-news/mediawire/
243744/l-a-times-reporter-talks-about-his-story-writing-quakebot/. 
4 Id. 
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coming hurricanes or tornadoes are created using similar software; or perhaps if 
financial reports exclude certain information, and the exclusion leads people to 
make bad investments. 
Whatever one may say about liability for such allegedly incomplete reports, it 
cannot be enough to say that “[the plaintiff’s] theory is that [the newspaper’s or 
wire service’s] software program, not the information it produces, is the defective 
product.” After all, the software program would simply embody the newspaper’s or 
wire service’s editorial choices about what information ought to be included in the 
article. The same is true for PDX’s software. 
B. Google and similar search engines likewise have computerized algorithms 
that choose what material to include where in the search results—and what to 
omit—as well as what snippets of that material to display. Say someone searches 
for drug information, or for mushroom information, gets results that a jury may see 
as dangerously incomplete (because important pages or excerpts were not included), 
and acts on those results in a way that causes harm.  
Again, whatever one may say about liability for dissemination of such allegedly 
incomplete information, it cannot be enough to say that “[the plaintiff’s] theory is 
that [the search engine’s] software program, not the information it produces, is the 
defective product.” The software program embodies the search engine company’s 
editorial judgment about what information is to be included in the output. Liability 
based on that output would be liability based on supposedly defective information. 
See Zhang, 2014 WL 1282730, at *6 (holding that a search engine company’s 
“design[ing] its search-engine algorithms” in a way that excludes certain 
information is the exercise of First Amendment rights). 
* * * 
The decision below is therefore mistaken in its treatment of prior precedent and 
is likely mistaken on the bottom line as well. Moreover, it potentially affects many 
prospective defendants beyond just PDX and other distributors of pharmaceutical 
information. The case therefore merits this Court’s more careful review. 
 
 
Sincerely, 
 
Eugene Volokh 
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